by P.J. Blount with the blog faculty
From the Department of State:
Prospects for U.S.-Russia Missile Defense Cooperation
Frank A. Rose
Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Verification, Compliance, and Implementation
Remarks at the 11th Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies (RUSI) Missile Defence Conference
London, United Kingdom
May 27, 2010
Thank you very much for that kind introduction, Michael.
Good afternoon, ladies and gentlemen.
On behalf of Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and Under Secretary of State Ellen Tauscher, it is a pleasure to join you today. RUSI has such an impressive history and this conference is an important part of the international dialogue on missile defense. I am particularly glad to see such an international audience. We have obviously been doing a lot of work on missile defense lately and we appreciate the opportunity to continue these discussions with you.
I’d like to focus my remarks on the prospects for missile defense cooperation between the United States and the Russian Federation. More specifically, I want to discuss three points:
* The threat posed by ballistic missile proliferation to U.S. deployed forces, allies, partners, and Russia;
* Our efforts to work with Russia to promote understanding and cooperation on missile defense issues; and
* And, at a strategic level, the U.S. goal to pursue with Russia a new approach to strategic stability that integrates both defensive and offensive capabilities.
Let me begin by providing some background for the new U.S. approach to missile defense. This new U.S. approach has been driven by growth in the regional ballistic missile threat and new technology opportunities offered by increasingly capable missile defense systems such as sea-based Aegis SM-3 interceptors and new forward-based sensors for detecting and tracking missiles. The overwhelming ballistic missile threat to U.S. deployed forces and our friends and allies comes from short- and medium-range ballistic missiles. That said, states like North Korea and Iran also continue to pursue technologies to support long-range missile development, but there remains uncertainty about when a missile threat to the U.S. homeland will mature. Given these two key factors, the President’s missile defense program will focus greater attention on countering the current threat to U.S. forces, Allies, and partners while maintaining our ability to defend the homeland.
This new approach was crystallized in the Ballistic Missile Defense Review Report or BMDR, released in February 2010. In particular, the BMDR says the Administration “has given a special emphasis to renewing cooperation with Russia on missile defense.”
This engagement strategy with Russia reflects the reality of our post-Cold War relationship. Russia is increasingly our partner in confronting issues like proliferation and other threats to regional and global peace and security, including Iran’s pursuit of nuclear weapons, the North Korean nuclear issue, and, most recently, North Korea’s role in the sinking of the Cheonan. We seek ways to expand that cooperation; in particular, we believe that true cooperation on missile defense will do two things: enhance Russia’s understanding about our capabilities and intentions, and provide meaningful security in response to the 21st century threats facing both our governments.
THE BALLISTIC MISSILE THREAT
Current global trends indicate that ballistic missile systems are becoming more flexible, mobile, survivable, reliable, and accurate, while also increasing in range. Russia’s geographic location puts it in proximity to two of the world’s most active proliferators of ballistic missiles: North Korea and Iran. Both of these countries are developing longer-range missiles, both have pursued illicit weapons programs in defiance of the international community, and both have a tendency to put on large-scale missile launch displays as a means to intimidate their neighbors.
North Korea has demonstrated its nuclear ambitions and continues to develop short-, medium-, and intermediate-range ballistic missile capabilities. Shortly after the Obama Administration took office in 2009, North Korea conducted its second nuclear test, launched a Taepo Dong-2 (TD-2) missile which apparently failed, and conducted multiple ballistic missile launches. Assuming no major changes in its national security strategy over the next decade, the United States believes that North Korea will be able to mate a nuclear warhead to a proven delivery system.
Regarding Iran, its ballistic missile forces are increasing quantitatively and improving qualitatively. Numerous U.S. and NATO officials have expressed their concerns about this disturbing trend. Iran has the largest inventory of ballistic missiles in the Middle East, which a recent Pentagon report estimates at approximately 1000 missiles that range from 90-1200 miles, and continues to expand the scale, reach, and sophistication of its ballistic missile forces. It has tested a two stage solid-propellant missile and placed a satellite into orbit using an indigenous launch vehicle.
On March 27 of this year, NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen noted that the declared 2000 kilometer range of Iran’s modified Shahab-3 missiles [quote] “…will already put Allied countries such as Turkey, Greece, Romania and Bulgaria within reach.”
I would note that, not only can these same missiles strike NATO territory, but they can also reach parts of Russia.
Iran’s long-range ballistic missile development is also a concern. In February, Iran displayed its Simorgh space launch vehicle that would use a cluster of four engines in its first stage. In April, Lieutenant General Ronald Burgess, Director of the U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency, testified before the U.S. Senate that Iran could, “with sufficient foreign assistance, develop and test an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) capable of reaching the United States by 2015.”
All of these developments must also be seen in light of Iran’s continuing defiance of the international community on its nuclear program, including what the IAEA has identified as the “possible military dimension” to its program. Many of these ballistic missiles are capable of carrying nuclear payloads.
North Korea and Iran are the most challenging of the ballistic missile threats facing the world community today. They continue these programs despite international efforts, including through UN Security Council Resolutions, to prevent them. However, they are not alone. The growth of regional threats today lies in the development, deployment, and proliferation of ballistic missiles and technologies, especially in short-, medium-, and intermediate-range missiles. Improvements in payloads, ranges, precision, and operational performance are evident as well. These disturbing trends reinforce the importance of building consensus with other governments about the effects of this proliferation on regional stability and security, and of the need for missile defense cooperation.
WORKING WITH RUSSIA
In an effort to promote understanding and cooperation on missile defense issues, Presidents Obama and Medvedev agreed at the July 2009 Moscow Summit to conduct joint assessments of missile challenges and threats, which we now refer to as the Joint Threat Assessment, or JTA, for short.
The objective of these talks has been, at a minimum, to share with one another our respective threat perspectives and, if possible, to come to agreement on the nature of the common threats that we face. Our Governments have held three JTA sessions, in July and December 2009, and again this month. Further sessions are anticipated.
From the U.S. side, we have found these discussions to be informative and helpful. We recognize that reasonable governments can analyze and assess threats in different ways. Our hope is that through the JTA discussions, Moscow will gain a deeper understanding of why the United States is pursuing both development and deployment of ballistic missile defense in Europe and other regions of the world, and in such a relatively shortened timeframe.
At the July 2009 Moscow Summit, our two Presidents also agreed to organize contacts between our two governments in a more structured and regular way. To do this they established the U.S.-Russia Bilateral Presidential Commission. Under the auspices of that commission, the Arms Control and International Security Working Group was established, co-chaired by Under Secretary of State Ellen Tauscher and Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergey Ryabkov. This working group is responsible for, among other matters, missile defense cooperation.
Within this forum, the United States has offered a number of proposals for bilateral missile defense cooperation. Specific areas of potential cooperation include, among other things:
* Joint research and development;
* Joint missile defense testing;
* Joint modeling and simulations;
* Missile defense exercises; and
* Joint analyses of alternative U.S.-Russian missile defense architectures for defending against common, regional threats.
These recent proposals build on earlier initiatives that involved sharing missile warning data and providing timely launch notifications between our two countries.
Additionally, Russia made a proposal in 2007, reiterated by President Medvedev in 2008, to share data from the early warning radars at Qabala in Azerbaijan, and at Armavir in southern Russia, to monitor Iranian flight tests. The United States remains interested in exploring this Russian proposal further.
All of these discussions and activities can, and should be, pursued. In this way, we believe pragmatic missile defense cooperation can be achieved in a timely fashion, and allow us to respond to the current threat.
MISSILE DEFENSE AND STRATEGIC STABILITY
For the United States, the goal of missile defense cooperation is to enlist Russia in a new structure of deterrence that addresses the emerging challenges that a small number of states seeking illicit capabilities pose to international peace and security. Moreover, the Administration seeks to develop a mutual understanding of a new approach to strategic stability that integrates both defensive and offensive capabilities. As noted in our recently released Nuclear Posture Review, the United States is working to reduce the role and number of U.S. nuclear weapons. Missile defenses are a key aspect of strengthening our non-nuclear defense and deterrence capabilities.
Here is where the recently signed New START Treaty comes into consideration. This Treaty addresses offensive nuclear force reductions by setting aggregate limits of:
* 1,550 warheads on deployed intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), deployed submarine launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), and nuclear warheads counted for deployed heavy bombers;
* 700 deployed strategic delivery vehicles; and
* 800 total deployed and non-deployed ICBM launchers, SLBM launchers, and nuclear-capable heavy bombers.
The Treaty allows Russia and the United States flexibility in determining how to deploy their strategic forces within the Treaty’s overall limits. The Treaty’s verification regime builds on lessons learned from 15 years of implementing START, including on-site inspections, data exchanges, and extensive notifications. The Treaty also protects our ability to develop and deploy a prompt global strike capability, should we opt to pursue it.
Most importantly for our discussion today, the New START Treaty preserves our ability to develop and deploy ballistic missile defenses, which are necessary for the defense of the United States and our allies against limited attack and as part of our collaborative approach to strengthening stability in key regions. As we emphasize repeatedly, U.S. missile defenses are in no way aimed at Russia, but rather they are designed and planned to counter -the growing ballistic missile threats from states like Iran and North Korea. U.S. missile defenses do not have the capability to defend against the sophisticated Russian deterrent, nor do we possess the sheer numbers of interceptors that would be required to counter Russian ICBM and SLBM forces. We will continue to provide Russia with transparency and predictability about U.S. missile defense policy, plans, and programs.
Taken together, we believe that this approach to strategic stability – nuclear force reductions in New START, a phased adaptive approach to missile defense that includes U.S.-Russian missile defense cooperation, transparency and confidence building measures (TCBMs), and engagement on a wide range of activities – will facilitate the two nations’ commitment to deeper reductions in their nuclear arsenals and to improve the overall relationship.
NATO-RUSSIA MISSILE DEFENSE COOPERATION
We believe that the most effective way to eliminate Russia’s concerns regarding our European missile defense deployments is for the United States, NATO, and Russia to work together against common threats.
The United States strongly supports efforts to foster cooperation between NATO and Russia in the missile defense area, and we are working closely with our NATO allies and Russia to explore options to cooperate. Secretary of State Clinton noted this in her January 29th speech in Paris on the future of European security. She said, and I quote,
“We are engaged in productive discussions with our European allies about building a new missile defense architecture that will defend all of NATO territory against ballistic missile attack. And we are serious about exploring ways to cooperate with Russia to develop missile defenses that enhance the security of all of Europe, including Russia. Missile defense, we believe, will make this continent a safer place. That safety could extend to Russia, if Russia decides to cooperate with us. It is an extraordinary opportunity for us to work together to build our mutual security.”
At the 60th anniversary of NATO, held last spring in Strasbourg-Kehl, NATO leaders reaffirmed their support for increased missile defense cooperation with Russia and their readiness to explore the potential for linking U.S., NATO, and Russian missile defense systems. To paraphrase NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen’s remarks at the October 2009 Defense Ministerial in Bratislava, “this is good for the Alliance, it is good for solidarity, and it is important for the defense of Europe.”
In the coming months, the United States is committed to anchoring the Phased Adaptive Approach to European missile defense in a NATO context. At the NATO Summit in Lisbon this November, we look forward to an Alliance decision to adopt territorial missile defense as a NATO mission, and to expand NATO’s Active Layered Theater Ballistic Missile Defense (ALTBMD) command and control system from protection of deployed forces to include territorial missile defense.
We are committed to continuing cooperation with Russia in this sphere, and believe that NATO-Russia cooperation on missile defense should be built upon our successful record of cooperation on theater missile defense in the NATO-Russia Council. This includes a study launched in 2003 to assess possible levels of interoperability among NATO and Russian TMD systems, three command post exercises held from 2004-2006, and a computer-assisted exercise in 2008. By building upon this track record and adding the progress we’ve made in 2010 through the NATO-Russia Joint Review of 21st century threats, we hope to work with Russia so that they are ready to engage in substantial, substantive missile defense cooperation with NATO.
Let me conclude with a couple of points.
As the United States continues to deploy missile defenses, we will continue to engage Russia, in an open and transparent manner, about our missile defense plans.
As the relationship between our two nations becomes stronger, we hope that Russia will recognize that U.S. missile defense plans are focused on threats from regional actors such as North Korea and Iran and are not a threat to Russia’s security.
The door to tangible, mutually beneficial missile defense cooperation with the United States, and potentially with NATO, is wide open.
We look forward to continuing our discussions with Russia and to finding ways to cooperate and mutually protect our nations’ national security interests.
Thank you for the opportunity to speak to you today. I look forward to any questions that you might have.
by P.J. Blount with the blog faculty
S. 3451: A bill to authorize assistance to Israel for Iron Dome anti-missile defense system was introduced on May 27, 2010 by Sen. Barbara Boxer (D-CA).
H. Res. 1411: Honoring the service and commitment of the 111th Fighter Wing, Pennsylvania Air National GuardMay 28, 2010 at 10:47 am | Posted in Aviation Law | Leave a comment
by P.J. Blount with the blog faculty
H. Res. 1411: Honoring the service and commitment of the 111th Fighter Wing, Pennsylvania Air National Guard was introduced on May 27, 2010 by Rep. Allyson Schwartz (D-PA13).
by P.J. Blount with the blog faculty
by P.J. Blount with the blog faculty
From the White House:
The White House
Office of the Press Secretary
For Immediate Release
May 27, 2010
Advancing Our Interests: Actions in Support of the President’s National Security Strategy
. . .New START: The United States concluded a New START Treaty with Russia, which was signed by Presidents Obama and Medvedev on April 8, reducing the limits on strategic offensive warheads by approximately 30 percent and the limits on strategic delivery vehicles by over 50 percent compared with previous treaties. New START reestablished U.S. and Russian cooperation and leadership on arms control and non-proliferation, advanced U.S.-Russia relations, and preserved the flexibility that the United States needs to protect its security and its allies. The New START Treaty has been submitted to the Senate for advice and consent to ratification and we hope to have the treaty into force by the end of this year. . . .
. . . Improved and Strengthened Missile Defense: In September 2009, the President announced a new approach to missile defense in Europe – the Phased Adaptive Approach – which enhances the collective defense of the United States, our deployed forces, and our allies and partners against existing and emerging ballistic missile threats from the Middle East. The Phased Adaptive Approach will deploy proven technologies and capabilities resulting in more comprehensive coverage for Europe sooner, and will be flexible, adaptive, and scalable to the evolving threat. Furthermore, as described in the February 2010 Ballistic Missile Defense Review Report, the U.S. will sustain and enhance our ability to defend the U.S. homeland against the threat of limited ballistic missile attack and enhance missile defense cooperation with allies and partners around the world, including Russia. . . .
. . . National Export Strategy: President Obama put forward the National Export Initiative (NEI) with the goal of doubling exports over the next 5 years as part of a broad effort to increase economic growth and support several million jobs. The Initiative, lead by the newly created Export Promotion Cabinet, is focused on promoting exports by increasing advocacy and advice for exporters, particularly small and medium sized enterprises, improving access to export financing, reducing barriers to U.S. exports and services abroad, enforcing trade rules and agreements, and working through international institutions to foster sustained and balanced growth.
Export Control Reform: The Administration launched a major effort to reform our export control system so as to strengthen our national security by focusing our efforts on controlling the export of the most critical items while maintaining the competitiveness of key sectors of our economy. . . .
. . . Global Technology and Innovation Fund: In response to President Obama’s Cairo speech last June, the Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC) launched the global technology and innovation call for privately managed investment funds in October 2009. With the private sector capital catalyzed by OPIC, these Funds will have the potential to mobilize over $2 billion in private equity capital for Muslim-majority countries. All Funds remain subject to review and approval of OPIC’s Board of Directors.
Science Envoys: This program sends prominent U.S. scientists overseas to identify opportunities for new partnerships in science and technology. The first three envoys, Dr. Ahmed Zewail, Dr. Elias Zerhouni, and Dr. Bruce Alberts, have traveled across the world, from Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Qatar, Algeria, Tunisia, and Indonesia. Secretary Clinton has also committed to expanding the number of Environment, Science, Technology, and Health (ESTH) officers at U.S. embassies. . . .
by P.J. Blount with the blog faculty
From the Aviation Safety Network:
India to establish Civil Aviation Safety Advisory Council
In the wake of the serious accident involving an Air India Express Boeing 737 at Mangalore, the Civil Aviation Minister decided to establish the Civil Aviation Safety Advisory Council (CASAC).
The Council will work directly with the Directorate General of Civil Aviation (DGCA) and recommend steps for improving air safety.
The proposed Council will constitute of pilots, air traffic controllers, airport operators, the air force and medical specialists. Also representatives from manufactures like Boeing, Airbus and Bombardier will be special invitees to the Council.
by Joanne Irene Gabrynowicz with the blog faculty
Source: The White House
Leverage and Grow our Space Capabilities: For over 50 years, our space community has been a catalyst for innovation and a hallmark of U.S. technological leadership. Our space capabilities underpin global commerce and scientific advancements and bolster our national security strengths and those of our allies and partners. To promote security and stability in space, we will pursue activities consistent with the inherent right of self-defense, deepen cooperation with allies and friends, and work with all nations toward the responsible and peaceful use of space. To maintain the advantages afforded to the United States by space, we must also take several actions. We must continue to encourage cutting-edge space technology by investing in the people and industrial base that develops them. We will invest in the research and development of next-generation space technologies and capabilities that benefit our commercial, civil, scientific exploration, and national security communities, in order to maintain the viability of space for future generations. And we will promote a unified effort to strengthen our space industrial base and work with universities to encourage students to pursue space-related careers. (pg. 31)
We must work together to ensure the constant flow of commerce, facilitate safe and secure air travel, and prevent disruptions to critical communications. We must also safeguard the sea, air, and space domains from those who would deny access or use them for hostile purposes. This includes keeping strategic straits and vital sea lanes open, improving the early detection of emerging maritime threats, denying adversaries hostile use of the air domain, and ensuring the responsible use of space. As one key effort in the sea domain, for example, we will pursue ratification of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. (pg. 50)
Enhance Security at Home: Security at home relies on our shared efforts to prevent and deter attacks by identifying and interdicting threats, denying hostile actors the ability to operate within our borders, protecting the nation’s critical infrastructure and key resources, and securing cyberspace. That is why we are pursuing initiatives to protect and reduce vulnerabilities in critical infrastructure, at our borders, ports, and airports, and to enhance overall air, maritime, transportation, and space and cyber security. Building on this foundation, we recognize that the global systems that carry people, goods, and data around the globe also facilitate the movement of dangerous people, goods, and data. Within these systems of transportation and transaction, there are key nodes—for example, points of origin and transfer, or border crossings—that represent opportunities for exploitation and interdiction. Thus, we are working with partners abroad to confront threats that often begin beyond our borders. And we are developing lines of coordination at home across Federal, state, local, tribal, territorial, nongovernmental, and private-sector partners, as well as individuals and communities. (pg. 18)
Safeguarding the Global Commons: Across the globe, we must work in concert with allies and partners to optimize the use of shared sea, air, and space domains. These shared areas, which exist outside exclu- sive national jurisdictions, are the connective tissue around our globe upon which all nations’ security and prosperity depend. The United States will continue to help safeguard access, promote security, and ensure the sustainable use of resources in these domains. These efforts require strong multilateral cooperation, enhanced domain awareness and monitoring, and the strengthening of international norms and standards.
We must work together to ensure the constant flow of commerce, facilitate safe and secure air travel, and prevent disruptions to critical communications. We must also safeguard the sea, air, and space domains from those who would deny access or use them for hostile purposes. This includes keeping strategic straits and vital sea lanes open, improving the early detection of emerging maritime threats, denying adversaries hostile use of the air domain, and ensuring the responsible use of space. As one key effort in the sea domain, for example, we will pursue ratification of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. (pg. 49)
Use of Force
Military force, at times, may be necessary to defend our country and allies or to preserve broader peace and security, including by protecting civilians facing a grave humanitarian crisis. We will draw on diplo- macy, development, and international norms and institutions to help resolve disagreements, prevent conflict, and maintain peace, mitigating where possible the need for the use of force. This means credibly underwriting U.S. defense commitments with tailored approaches to deterrence and ensuring the U.S. military continues to have the necessary capabilities across all domains—land, air, sea, space, and cyber. It also includes helping our allies and partners build capacity to fulfill their responsibilities to contribute to regional and global security.
While the use of force is sometimes necessary, we will exhaust other options before war whenever we can, and carefully weigh the costs and risks of action against the costs and risks of inaction. When force is neces- sary, we will continue to do so in a way that reflects our values and strengthens our legitimacy, and we will seek broad international support, working with such institutions as NATO and the U.N. Security Council.
The United States must reserve the right to act unilaterally if necessary to defend our nation and our inter- ests, yet we will also seek to adhere to standards that govern the use of force. Doing so strengthens those who act in line with international standards, while isolating and weakening those who do not. We will also outline a clear mandate and specific objectives and thoroughly consider the consequences —intended and unintended—of our actions. And the United States will take care when sending the men and women of our Armed Forces into harm’s way to ensure they have the leadership, training, and equipment they require to accomplish their mission. (pg. 22)
by P.J. Blount with the blog faculty
From the IMSO:
IMSO NEWS 035
13 May 2010
SPAIN BECOMES FIRST IMSO MEMBER STATE TO ACCEPT CONVENTION AMENDMENTS
The IMSO Director General, Captain Esteban Pacha-Vicente, today announced that, on 5 May 2010, Spain became the first IMSO Member State to accept the amendments to the IMSO Convention. This acceptance was executed by the transmission to the Secretary-General of the International Maritime Organization (IMO), as Depositary of the IMSO Convention, of a formal letter from His Excellency the Ambassador of Spain to the United Kingdom, Mr Carles Maria Casajuana Palet.
The amendments to the IMSO Convention were adopted by the IMSO Assembly at its Twentieth Session, held in Malta, on 2 October 2008. In summary, the amendments relate to the extension of oversight of the GMDSS to other potential satellite providers, and the duties and responsibilities of IMSO as LRIT Coordinator appointed by IMO.
The amendments entered into force on the basis of provisional application from 6 October 2008, pending their formal entry into force. The amendments will enter formally into force 120 days after receipt of notice from two-thirds of States which were IMSO Parties at the time of adoption, at which time they will become binding for all IMSO Parties.
The Director General today said “I am extremely pleased that Spain is the first IMSO Party to accept the amendments to the IMSO Convention. I understand that many other Member States are in the process of accepting the amendments and I urge those involved to expedite the process in order to ensure their formal entry into force. I remain available to assist in this matter.”
by P.J. Blount with the blog faculty
From the Ukranian Space Agency:
Ukrainian-Russian Agreement on cooperation in utilization and development of the global navigation satellite system GLONASS was signed in Kyiv
May 17, 2010. In course of the official visit to Ukraine of the President of Russian Federation D. Medvedev the Agreement between the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine and the Government of Russian Federation on cooperation in utilization and development of Russian global navigation satellite system GLONASSS was signed.
From Ukraine the Agreement was signed by Director General of the National Space Agency of Ukraine Mr. Yuriy Alekseyev, from Russia – by Head of the Federal Space Agency of RF, Mr. Anatoliy Perminov.
The authorized body in charge of effecting cooperation foreseen by this Agreement from Ukraine shall be the National Space Agency of Ukraine, from Russian Federation – Federal Space Agency and Ministry of Defense of Russian Federation.
Goal of signing the Agreement is in establishing an appropriate organization and legal basis for mutually beneficial collaboration in utilization and development of GLONASS system.
Cooperation shall be effected in the following areas:
1) development of Ukrainian ground-based functional supplements for GLONASSS system, which shall allow providing of efficient utilization of the system by navigation signal consumers on the territory of Ukraine;
2) utilization of the data from Ukrainian ground infrastructure of GLONASS system for scientific and technical elaborations and scientific-applied researches;
3) designing of the functional supplement satellite payload for GLONASS and its installation on the geostationary satellites in order to establish Ukrainian satellite system of the functional supplement to GLONASS system;
4) designing of the navigation consumers hardware, which shall be operated within standard precision signals of GLONASS system, other navigational satellite systems and their functional supplements.
During the validation period of this Agreement Russian Party shall provide Ukrainian Party with access to the standard precision signals of GLONASS on continuous, global and unlimited basis in compliance with the current capabilities of GLONASS system.
Ukrainian satellite system of the functional supplement to GLONASS and Ukrainian ground infrastructure of GLONASS shall remain under jurisdiction and control of Ukraine.
The signed Agreement allows Ukrainian and Russian enterprises to conclude foreign economic agreements on providing the works in the satellite navigation area, conditions for creation of additional workplace in Ukraine and also promotion of Ukrainian enterprises at the global market of the satellite navigation services and technologies.
by P.J. Blount with the blog faculty
Press release IISL 2010-001: The IISL at fifty
26 May 2010
In 2010 the International Institute of Space Law (IISL) celebrates its fiftieth anniversary as the single-most authoritative international body on the law pertaining to outer space and space activities. Following a meeting of the organising committee in Paris in May 1960, the Statutes of the IISL were drafted and formally approved by the International Astronautical Foundation (IAF) on 15 August 1960. In 2007, the IISL became an independent organisation based in the Netherlands.
To celebrate this anniversary, firstly IISL has already co-organised a conference on �Space Law and Policy� in Washington, D.C., on 11 May 2010.
Secondly, during the forthcoming International Astronautical Conference, held in Prague between 27 September-1 October 2010, the IISL will organise a special session as part of its annual Colloquium on the Law of Outer Space. The �Nandasiri Jasentuliyana Keynote Lecture on Space Law� will this year consist of three lectures focusing on the history of space law, the IISL and two of the very early pioneers, Prof. V. Mandl and Prof. A. Meyer. These lectures will be delivered by Dr. S. Doyle, Prof. V. Kopal and Prof. S. Hobe of the Board of Directors of the IISL. It will be followed, as always, by the �Young Scholars Session�, under the chairmanship of Prof. V. Kopal and IISL President Mrs. T.L. Masson-Zwaan.
Thirdly, the IISL will also republish the 1972 book by Judge Lachs on �The law of outer space, an experience in contemporary law-making�. Judge Lachs was President of the IISL from 1990 to 1993, and President of the International Court of Justice from 1973 to 1976, having served on the Court from 1967 until his death in 1993. He also served as the first Chairman of the Legal Subcommittee of the UNCOPUOS from 1962 to 1966. His excellent 1972 book on space law has been out of print for years but is still used extensively by all generations of space lawyers. This new edition will be accompanied by an introduction by the IISL Directorate of Studies and a preface by the IISL President.
Lastly, a booklet on the IAA-IISL Roundtables, celebrating also the 25th Anniversary of the Roundtable, will be prepared in cooperation with the International Academy of Astronautics (IAA).
The second makes note of the recent conference co-hosted by the IISL in Washington, D.C.:
Press release IISL 2010-002: Space Law and Policy
27 May 2010
As part of the celebrations of its fiftieth anniversary, the International Institute of Space Law (IISL) organised together with the International Academy of Astronautics (IAA) (which also celebrates its fiftieth anniversary in 2010), the 1st IAA-IISL conference on �Space Law and Policy� in Washington, D.C., on 11 May 2010. The other partners in organising this high-level joint event were Arianespace Inc., Secure World Foundation (SWF) and the European Space Policy Institute (ESPI) from Vienna. The event was held at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace Building, and attended by more than 100 persons.
The goal of this event was to highlight the relevance of current space law issues to US policymakers, and their impact on US civil, commercial, and government activities in space. Speakers at this event also addressed the development of the international legal regime for space, provided US as well as European and Trans-Atlantic perspectives and evaluated whether the current regime is sufficient in view of ongoing developments in the space sector.
The programme consisted of sessions on the Commercial Space Legal Perspective (�What are the top three biggest legal challenges for the US space Industry?�), International Aspects (�How do you view the development of the international legal regime for space and is it sufficient?�) and the US Government perspective (�Space Law in Government Daily Life � Successes and Failures�). Key-note speeches were given by Richard DalBello, Vice President, Legal and Government Affairs, Intelsat General; Ambassador Ciro Ar�valo, Chair, United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space; and Lori Garver, Deputy Administrator, NASA.
More information about the event can be obtained by visiting http://www.espi.or.at/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=493&Itemid=1.